Home The Nature and Objective of Aesthetics The Possibility of a Definition of Beauty and Art The Value of a Definition of Beauty What Aesthetics Is The Material For a Definition Art and the Artist The Art Work The Art Work in the Making The Creative Mind Art and the Artist Art and the Layman The Experience of Beauty Beauty in Music Painting Poetry	THE VALUE OF A DEFINITION OF BEAUTY Pater's statement regarding the value of an abstract definition of beauty is both true and false. It is true that such a definition is no aid to the enjoyment of "what has been well done in art or poetry," but it is not true that it does not help us "to discriminate between what is more and what is less excellent in them, or to use words like beauty, excellence, art, poetry, with a more precise meaning than they would otherwise have." Pater himself gives just such a "universal for- mula" for beauty, which he deplores in aestheticians, when he calls music the measure of all the arts, because music alone completely realizes a perfect identification of form and matter, and then proceeds to discriminate between what is more and what is less excellent in the arts by means of this universal formula for beauty. How else can one discriminate if not in terms of some standard other than one's own likes and dislikes. Does not one often like food which is anything but nutritious, while disliking other food which is nutritious? How is one then to discriminate between what is good food or bad food unless through a definition of food, in terms of which one may evaluate one's own tastes? In what other manner than a definition of beauty can one ascertain whether one's response to some art work is or is not aesthetic? Certainly all responses to art works are not of the nature of beauty. They may be ethical, utilitarian, moralistic, anything but aesthetic. Rodin Unless then we make the apparently absurd claim that a response is one of beauty just because it is derived from an art work, we must have a universal formula for beauty if we are to evaluate our reactions to art, and use the word beauty with some precision. Now to discriminate does not necessarily mean to like and appreciate. Admiration is not necessarily appreciation. I may discriminate between my friends, X and Y, and conclude that X is more intelligent than Y, but at the same time I may prefer Y to X. I may discriminate between food articles X and Y and discover that X is more nourishing than Y, and yet prefer Y to X. I may discriminate between poets, X and Y, and conclude that X is a greater poet than Y, and yet prefer to read Y. There are many of us who prefer to read Edgar Guest to Robert Frost, although we are convinced that Frost is a poet while Guest is a sentimental rhymester. Intellectual discrimination and personal inclination are not inseparable. Now there is no need for a standard to determine one's likes and dislikes. But how can one discriminate, evaluate, unless by a standard other than one's tastes, namely, by a universal formula rather than personal inclination. The claim that beauty is relative is not true. It is absolute, that is, its nature as an experience, its characteristics as an attitude, are the same whenever and wherever and to whomsoever it occurs. What is relative is the object that arouses it. Hence a definition of beauty is not only possible, but useful for discrimination and judgment, although it is no help to appreciation. It is of much value to be able to judge intelligently, even where appreciation is lacking, that is, to be able to draw a distinction between one's reaction to an art work and the significance of an art work as art. A novel may not appeal to one, and yet be a great work of art as a novel, just as an article of food may not taste good and yet be excellent as nourishment. The value of an art work to me is determined by my reaction to it, but its value as an art work, as a successful creative expression for its creator, is entirely independent of any one's reaction to it. While it is true, then, that of tastes there is no disputing, it is also true that of tastes there is evaluating, even of one's own tastes. This standard for discrimination, for evaluation, is supplied by a definition of beauty, a universal formula for it, the kind of experience it is whenever and wherever it occurs, how it differs from other experiences, such as the good, the true, or the useful. In evidence that a definition of beauty is not only valuable as a standard of judgment, but that consciously or unconsciously we actually use such a standard, let us consider some problems in art that have been and are being widely discussed. Is art for all or for the few? On both sides of this question there are ardent defenders and detractors. But ardor never answers a question with any degree of adequacy. It only intensifies the issue, besides confusing it. The "art for the few" champions can cite the history of art as evidence that works that were widely hailed in their day as art have disappeared, and some of those most severely denounced have survived, while the advocates of "art for all" can appeal to human nature with its universal craving for beauty. But such evidence proves nothing excepting that anything can be proven to suit the particular inclination or prejudice of the contender. Popular appeal can not be relied upon, says one side, since historically great art never had a popular reception. But history proves just the opposite, retorts the other side, for ultimately it is popular appeal that establishes the significance of an art work. Wagner and Keats may have been viciously denounced in their day but in the long run it was popular taste that vindicated them. But either side fails to take account of the crucial issue, namely, whether an art work is great because it survives, or whether its initial greatness is responsible for its persistence. And this crucial question can not be answered otherwise than by a definition of art, its place and function in human life, what craving it satisfies, and whether all human beings possess the appetite for art in like degree, and is the appetite satisfied by the same or similar food or does it call for a variety of foods. And if appetites differ in degree of hunger, what is the nature of this difference and what sort of art food do the differences call for? Invariably, in any contention both sides to the argument are at the same time right and wrong. Each side is right from its standpoint and wrong from the standpoint of the other. The "art for the few" side must base its standpoint on some feeling as to what art is. And likewise the "art for all" side. But neither states definitely what its standpoint is. Hence, the endless and fruitless discussion. Would it not be advisable therefore that the feeling be made articulate so that each side would understand what the other is talking about, and thus substitute disinterested examination for heated quarreling and bickering? We can not consequently deal with this question intelligently excepting by means of a clearcut definition of art and beauty. Then we have the question of standard in art. One camp proclaims that the sole standard is the individual response. The other camp counters that the value of an art work is inherent in the art work, and does not depend on the effect it produces, that an art work judges us, not we the art work. Now again both sides seem to be right and also wrong. If a product does not evoke beauty in one it is not an art work. On the other hand, it may arouse beauty in another, and hence it is an art work. But how can one and the same object be both an art work and not an art work? Where lies its basic value as an art work, within itself as an expression of the artist, or in its effect on the observer? Is an object necessarily an art work just because it appeals or gives pleasure? Experience answers no. I may read a novel, enjoy it greatly, yet also feel that its value as an art work is small or nil, as I may eat an article of food whose taste pleases me but whose value as food I know to be negative. There is therefore no necessary relationship between an effect, and the significance of the stimulus producing the effect in terms of itself. A judgment of value does not invariably depend on the effect produced. The standard for the value may be different from the standard for the effect. One standard is intellectual, in terms of the inherent nature of the object as belonging to a certain class, and fulfilling a certain impersonal function, the other is affective in terms of its personal appeal. Here, then, we have another instance of an art problem where a standard is not only valuable, but is actually used in our judgments. Now this standard must be our feeling of what art and beauty truly are, for how could I otherwise conclude that what pleases me is not necessarily real art? To examine this feeling and make it articulate would give us a definition of beauty and art. Another perennial and troublesome problem in art is the relationship existing between art and morality. There is the cult of "art for art's sake," implying that art is its own justification, and the dogma of "art for man's sake," that the value of art is its moral influence. And again both cult and dogma appear to be right and also wrong. For it can not be said that the sole or even secondary objective of the creator of an art work is to teach or preach. Nor is a product an art work simply because a moral can be derived from it, or because its intention is to point a moral. Yet a preachment may be an art work, but it is not an art work just because it is a good preachment. Its value as a preachment appears to be apart from its value as beauty. On the other hand, any art product that does evoke the experience of beauty, is moral, in that its effect is positive, wholesome, good. Such an effect can not possibly be evil. Once again we have a case of two standards, since what we judge to be moral we do not also judge to be beautiful, and we prize beauty not for its morality, but for what it is as beauty. What is that standard for beauty? And would not the quibbling about art and morality die a natural and quiet death if this standard that we unconsciously use were brought to the surface and applied to this problem?